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ABSTRACT
The last decade has seen the emergence of alternative sources of
early-stage finance, which are radically changing and reshaping the
start-up eco-system. These include incubators, accelerators, science
and technology parks, university-affiliated seed funds, corporate
seed funds, business angels – including “super-angels”, angel
groups, business angel networks and angel investment funds –
and both equity- and debt-based crowdfunding platforms. In par-
allel with this development, large financial institutions that have
traditionally invested in late-stage and mature companies, have
increasingly diversified their investment portfolios to “get into the
venture game”, in some cases, through the traditional closed-end
funds model and, in other cases through direct investments and co-
investments alongside the closed-end funds. This paper reviews the
main features, investment policies and risk-return profiles of the
institutional and informal investors operating in the very early
stage of the life cycle of entrepreneurial firms. It concludes that
traditional closed-end venture capital funds continue to play an
important role in early stage finance because of their unique com-
petences (e.g. screening, negotiating and monitoring) in what has
become a wider and more complex financing ecosystem.
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1. Introduction: is venture capital close to its demise?
A lifecycle approach has commonly been used to identify the funding options available to
businesses. This enables the decomposition of the capital market industry into different
segments, each one of which is tailored to relatively homogeneous groups of companies in
terms of maturity, stage of development, size, typical investment needs, information avail-
ability, corporate ownership and governance models (Ang 1992; Carey et al. 1993; Petersen
and Carpenter 2002). Various explanations have been developed in the finance theory to
interpret the choices of capital structure that businessmanagersmake for the companies they
are running. These include trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963; De Angelo and
Masulis, 1980; Fama and French 2002), agency theory (Jensen andMeckling 1976; Myers 1977;
Jensen 1986) and the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 1984). However, when focusing
on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), it is widely accepted that information
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asymmetries together with firm size and age play a major role in determining both what
segment of the capital market – public or private – and what types of finance to seek at each
stage of a company’s life cycle, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Berger and Udell 1998). Such an
approach allows the identification of potential funding gaps at various points in a company’s
growth path that could be filled through appropriate funding strategies aimed at finding the
most suitable type of financial investor (Mason 2006; Sohl 2007).
Focusing on newly created and young SMEs, the empirical evidence shows that each
financial system is affected by a certain amount of allocative inefficiency, resulting in
a gap – often referred to as the “primary funding gap” – between the demand for
financial resources by start-up companies and the supply of early-stage equity capital
(Mason and Harrison 2000; Hall and Lerner 2010; Landström and Mason 2016; Wilson,
Duruflè, and Hellmann 2018). According to pecking order theory, after the choice of
internal financing represented by the “insider seed money” coming from the entrepre-
neurs and the “family and friends tranche”, venture capital has – since its origins in the
aftermath of the end of World War II – been the dominant source of early-stage finance
(Bruton, Fried, and Manigart 2005; Kaplan and Lerner 2017).1 This arises from the
uniqueness of their operations and investment practices and expertise in the screening
process (Chan 1983; Wright and Robbie 1998; Cumming 2006; Chemmanur, Krishnan,
and Nandy 2011), the monitoring of contractual provisions (Admati and Pfleiderer 1994;
Gompers 1995; Bergemann and Hege 1998; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003; Cumming and
Johan 2013), implementation of the staged investing mechanism (Sahlman 1990;
Bergemann and Hege 1998; Cornelli and Yosha 2003), the syndication of investments
(Lerner 1994; Filatotchev, Wright, and Arberk 2006; Manigart et al. 2006; Tian 2011), and
Figure 1. Firm continuum and sources of finance.
Source: Berger and Udell (1998)
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exit practices (Black and Gilson 1998; Hellmann 2006; Giot and Schwienbacher 2007), as
well as due to the compensation schemes applied to the executives of venture capital
closed-end funds or to the general partners of venture partnerships (Gompers and
Lerner 1999; Metrick and Yasuda 2010).2
In the standard representation of the business financing cycle, for a start-up com-
pany, the capability to raise equity capital from a venture capitalist or a syndicate of
venture capitalists constitutes a crucial and visible achievement. This capability may be
used in later stages of the company’s development where bank lending-based indirect
finance, on the one hand, and direct finance (Initial Public Offerings [IPOs] and bond
issues), on the other hand, are the most accessible and appropriate financing facilities
available. Indeed, within the venture capital industry, to complete such a growth path, it
is common for a business to go through multiple follow-on investments involving either
the existing venture capitalists or a new set of investors, giving rise to series A, B, C and
n funding rounds.
However, despite the continuing relevance of the venture capital industry, over the
last decade, the growing emergence of alternative sources of early-stage funding can be
observed, which is radically changing and reshaping the start-up eco-system, with
implications for the entrepreneurial finance literature (Bruton et al. 2015; Fraser,
Bhaumik, and Wright 2015; Landström and Mason 2016; OECD 2017; Bellavitis et al.
2017). These alternative sources of funding involve a variety of players, including
incubators, accelerators, science and technology parks, university-affiliated seed funds,
corporate seed funds, business angels – including “super-angels”, angel groups, business
angel networks and angel investment funds – and both equity- and debt-based crowd-
funding platforms (Mitchell 2010; Hoffman and Radojevich-Kelley 2012; Capizzi and
Carluccio 2016). Each of these investors has unique risk-return profiles and investment
philosophies, their own investment practices and preferred exit options. This creates
major challenge for scholars, as well as for practitioners and policymakers, to design
a linear and well-structured start-up financing path that includes all of these new actors
(Hellman, Schure, and Vo 2017).
The start-up ecosystem is completed by non-equity financing investors – such as banks,
government and regional development agencies – and by other actors providing expert
services to both entrepreneurs and investors, such as business advisors, lawyers, investment
banks, gatekeepers, foundations and non-profit organizations, governments, universities
and research centres (Busenitz et al. 2003; Isenberg 2010; OECD 2011; Wilson 2015).
The emergence of new actors supporting the development of start-ups and young
SMEs is not the only phenomenon affecting the venture capital industry. Large financial
institutions experienced in operating in the capital markets, investing in late-stage and
mature companies are increasingly diversifying their investment portfolios in an attempt
to “get into the venture game” through, in some cases, the well consolidated business
model of closed-end funds, which is based on the separation of the asset managers (the
“general partners”) and the investors (the “limited partners”), and in other cases, through
direct investments by the limited partners or through co-investments alongside closed-
end funds. Among the actors that are currently increasingly assuming equity positions in
start-ups – the so-called “alternative investments” asset class – are large private equity
and buyout funds – both publicly traded and unlisted – hedge funds, funds-of-funds,
sovereign wealth funds, foundations and endowments, private debt, mezzanine funds,
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holding companies listed special purpose acquisition vehicles, insurance companies and
pension funds (Chernenko, Lerner, and Zeng 2017).
A prominent example of the dramatic change that is transforming the early-stage
financing industry is Uber, which – according to Crunchbase data – passed through 15
funding rounds in less than seven years (from 1 August 2009 to 7 July 2016), raising
more than $12 billion, involving, after the founders’ investment, an angel round, eight
follow-on venture rounds, three private equity rounds and two debt financing rounds
(Figure 2).
These developments – the emergence of alternative providers of both early- and
later-stage financing – appear to have reduced the traditional space in which venture
capital operates, resulting a growing debate about its future role. In this review paper,
we focus on the challenges as well as market opportunities available for venture capital
to elucidate to identify the main features, investment policies and risk-return profiles of
institutional and informal investors operating in, or gaining access to, the very early
stage of the life cycle of SMEs. Our main contribution is to provide a comprehensive
representation that could be useful for the identification of new and more effective
fundraising strategies aimed at further incentivizing entrepreneurship and boosting
innovation across countries at different stages of development and completeness of
their capital markets, particularly their venture capital markets. The remainder of the
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the major features and sources
of differences among early stage companies. Section 3 focuses on the informal venture
capital market, highlighting the investment aptitudes and practices of business angels
and current developments in angel investing. Section 4 presents the main features,
strengths and weaknesses of equity crowdfunding. In section 5, we discuss the chal-
lenges and opportunities related to the emergence of large institutional investors that
Figure 2. Uber funding rounds: 2009–2016.
Source: Crunchbase
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have been complementing their traditional asset classes with direct investments in start-
ups. Finally, section 6 summarizes the relationships and the growth potential envisaged
for the various sources of finance discussed in the paper and presents suggestions for
future research and policy.
2. Segmenting early-stage companies: scalability, funding gap, scope and
growth potential
When investigating the distinguishing features, investment needs, revenue model and
cash flow generation patterns of new ventures, the finance literature mostly neglects the
heterogeneity of start-up companies. Start-up companies do not all share the same
intrinsic growth potential and, therefore, are not all considered a relevant target for
professional formal equity investors. In accordance with the terminology widely used by
professionals and venture capitalists, it is a matter of “scalability”. All companies are
scalable to a given point, but some have to make significant changes to their business
models to grow beyond a certain point (due to high vs. low upfront investments, capital
vs. labour intensive technologies, tailor-made vs. standardized products, and so on). In
some cases, the entrepreneur is not able to adapt the company to the dynamic environ-
ment or is not able to understand how the company needs to change. Moreover, not all
entrepreneurs have the desire and capability to scale up to a large organization, preferring
instead (i) a comfortable living for themselves, family and friends, (ii) a majority equity
stake, and (iii) low risk – and not profit maximizing – strategies. In the entrepreneurship
literature, such entrepreneurs are described as “lifestyle” as opposed to “growth-oriented
” – or Schumpeterian – entrepreneurs (Burns 2001).
The equity gap – termed the “primary funding gap” in the previous section –
represents a second problem that start-ups and especially early stage companies have
to cope with. The typical monetary investment needed in the very early stages of
a company’s lifecycle is often limited not because of a lack of “ambition” but because
of the lack of “marketability” of the company’s output, which still has to be tested,
eventually produced and promoted. Therefore, for many start-ups with a strong orienta-
tion to innovation and in which R&D investments represent a high percentage of their
overall initial investment needs, they may never reach the point when additional
investment is required to convert the outcome of their R&D efforts into products that
are sold in the market. The possibility of stimulating innovation and technology break-
throughs relies on the capability to offer specific solutions to this primary funding gap
(Hall and Lerner 2010). This requires successive rounds of financing aimed at enabling
the innovative companies to further develop the fruits of their previous R&D invest-
ments and to fine tune a feasible and competitive business model (“secondary funding
gap”) (Hellmann and Puri 2000; Sohl 2007; Kerr and Nanda 2014; Kraemer-Eis, Botsari,
and Prencipe 2016; Wilson, Duruflè, and Hellmann 2018).
In terms of the size of equity investment, several studies show that young SMEs
require a relatively small amount of capital, usually in the range of €50,000 and €300,000
(Sohl 1999; Wong, Bhatia, and Freeman 2009; European Commission, 2015; Landström
and Mason 2016; OECD 2017), which in most cases, falls below the minimum investment
threshold of private equity and venture capital firms. Typically, venture capitalists, both
US- and Europe-based, prefer to invest in highly innovative firms that have higher
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minimum investment needs, usually over €1,000,000 (Manigart et al. 2002; Mason,
Botelho, and Harrison 2013; Kaplan and Lerner 2017; EY 2017). Thus, there is often an
imbalance between, on the one hand, the size of the investment needs of young new
ventures, and, on the other hand, the monetary and non-monetary costs faced by
venture capitalists to screen, evaluate and monitor such an informationally opaque
class of equity investments, ultimately making it uneconomic for them to deploy
financial resources under a minimum amount.
Another major differentiating factor is the size of new ventures’ competitive arena:
some start-ups have the potential from their earliest days to rapidly scale-up their
business and compete on a global basis (such as some fintech firms), while other
companies grow with a more restricted geographical focus that is inherently limited
on account of the nature of the business model adopted, such as for instance the case of
many service companies, most of all in the touristic industry.
In summary, though recognizing the relevance of macroeconomic, industry- and firm-
specific factors, it is possible to argue that the growth potential of a new venture is
largely written in its DNA and driven by the entrepreneurs’ goals, commitment, abilities
and orientation to innovation (Lerner et al. 2016; Hellman, Schure, and Vo 2017). The
company’s growth potential, in turn, is a major driver of its financing path, thus
determining, or at least strongly influencing, the type of investors that the company
can potentially access and the follow-on sources of funding available after the first
capital injection.
3. Informal venture capital market
One major alternative to venture capital that has emerged and become established over
the last two decades is the so-called informal venture capital market, the major actors of
which are business angels (BA) and business angel organizations. Often referred to as
informal investors, BAs are high net worth or affluent individuals, acting alone or in
formal or informal syndicates, who invest their own money in small unlisted companies
with which they have no family connections, typically assuming a minority equity stake,
as well as becoming actively involved in portfolio companies (Mason 2006). Alongside
the finance that they invest, BAs also provide valuable non-monetary resources, such as
industry knowledge, management experience, mentoring and personal networks
(Harrison and Mason 1992; Landström 1993; Politis 2008; Avdeitchikova and
Landström 2016). The key role of BAs in the economy is to fill the previously defined
primary funding gap between, on the one hand, the internal financing coming from the
entrepreneurs and their friends and family, and, on the other hand, the external finan-
cing raised from institutional VC firms, when the size of the required investment is too
great for the former and too small for the latter (Mason and Harrison 2000). In many
cases, angel financing can be structured as a loan that accrues interests over time and at
maturity, converts to equity at a discount to the value of the first follow-on funding
round led by an institutional investor (Wong, Bhatia, and Freeman 2009; Cumming 2012;
Chemmanur and Chen 2014).
The empirical evidence that has emerged in the last two decades from research
contributions investigating the informal venture capital markets all over the world, indi-
cates that in contrast to the other main actors of the early-stage financing industry,
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business angels do not focus only on seed and start-up investments. They also make
equity stakes in mature small companies that are managed by an executive who is in their
networks and that operates in industries that the BAs know very well, either because they
have already invested in the industry or have previously succeeded as an entrepreneur in
that industry (Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar 2014; Capizzi 2015; Mason 2016).
Regarding the investment practices of BAs, recent contributions emphasize the high
selectivity of their investment decisions as measured by their high rejection rates, which
are mostly related to the perceived quality of both the entrepreneur and the manage-
ment team (Mason, Botelho, and Zygmunt 2017). In the due diligence and valuation of
investment opportunities, their evaluation process emphasises personal and informal
sources over formal sources of information, thus bringing subjectivity, personal relation-
ships and qualitative non-financial information to their investment decisions (Harrison
and Mason 2017).
Another unique feature of the operation of BAs is the method that they use to
monitor their investments, which Bonini et al. (2018) refer to as “soft-monitoring”
mechanisms. Different from contractual-based monitoring mechanisms typically used
by venture capitalists to reduce potential conflicts and the incentives for opportunistic
behaviour by entrepreneurs (Sahlman 1990; Triantis 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003;
Gompers and Lerner 2004; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy 2011; Cumming 2008;
Wong, Bhatia, and Freeman 2009; Erenburg, Smith, and Smith 2016), the monitoring
mechanisms preferred by angel investors are non-aggressive and informal control
mechanisms based upon a close post-investment involvement in the relevant company
through company visits, interactions with entrepreneurs and other control techniques
based on trust (Van Osnabrugge 2000; Wiltbank and Boeker 2007; Ibrahim 2008; Wong,
Bhatia, and Freeman 2009; Goldfarb et al. 2013; Bonini and Capizzi 2017). Furthermore,
due to both the minority equity stake usually acquired by angel investors (Wiltbank et al.
2009; Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar 2014; Landström and Mason 2016) and the abovemen-
tioned weak legal protection implied by their soft-monitoring mechanisms, the small
amount of formal control is beneficial to the development and the duration over time of
a trust-based relationship between the angel investor and the entrepreneur. This, in
turn, could make it easier to involve venture capitalists and other institutional investors,
who, in contrast, will face uncertainty, information asymmetries and agency costs
through contractual-based control and governance mechanisms, in making follow-on
rounds of investment. The limited appetite of formal equity investors for potential
investee companies with complex underlying contractual relationships between the
entrepreneur and a business angel clearly implies that “the start-up’s need for further
funding from venture capitalists sets de facto limits on the terms of the angel invest-
ment contract” (Ibrahim 2008). Other studies that have investigated the dynamic inter-
action between business angels and venture capitalists, have revealed the existence of
a chronological pecking order in the entrepreneurs’ funding preferences, in which
companies first access the informal investors and then seek equity capital from formal
investors, but with the angels remaining in the investee companies, although with
a reduced equity holding (Schwienbacher 2009; Bruton, Chahine, and Filatotchev 2009;
Chemmanur and Chen 2014; Hellman and Thiele 2015).
An alternative and highly promising theoretical framework assumes the existence of
a substitution-based relationship rather than a complementary-based one between
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business angels and venture capitalists. The underlying rationale is that the synergies – if
any – enjoyed by VCs when investing in a target company after a prior angel-financing
round may be more than offset by other issues that have a negative impact on the
future performance of the investment itself. First, the dilution of the angels’ share-
holding as a consequence of the VC’s equity investment has to be managed, which
implies incurring transaction costs that could possibly impact the cohesion amongst the
three typologies of stockholders: company founders, BAs and VCs. Second, and con-
nected to the previous argument, BAs and VCs have different utility functions that lead
to different investment policies for the holding period, the returns target and, conse-
quently, for the strategic priorities that the investee company needs to design and
pursue. Third, the involvement of VCs may lead to significant changes in the governance
of the investee company, including the loss of the BA’s board seat and the recruitment
of new management by the VC, with the effect of further reducing the limited control
rights and decreasing the effectiveness of the angels’ soft-monitoring mechanisms.
These arguments suggest that the start-up ecosystem is much more complex than
that proposed by the standard finance theory that is based on the standard paradigm
of a company’s life cycle and the consequent identification of the different sources of
finance associated with each stage, as shown earlier in Figure 1. In accordance with
such a line of reasoning, Hellman, Schure, and Vo (2017) analysed the financial history
of a sample of Canadian companies over time and found that a company funded by
a given type of investor (business angel vs. venture capitalist) is likely to raise equity
capital in subsequent follow-on financing rounds from the same type of investor and is
less likely to be financed by investors of a different type. In other words, although such
a theoretical explanation has not been further developed and tested to date, the
dynamic interactions between start-ups and their investors could be firm-specific
and conditioned by their prior choices about the type of investor that provides the
first round of equity capital. This suggests the possibility of a “multidimensional”
ecosystem where start-ups have their own financing paths, which are different and
possibly parallel to each other, based on unique combinations of the many different
alternatives now available within the start-up ecosystem (Bessière, Stephany, and Wirtz
2018). We will discuss further the possible consequences for start-ups in the following
sections. But we first provide clarification regarding the differences between the main
types of investors considered in this paper.
3.1 The increasing role of angel groups and their contributions to the
performance of start-ups
While angel investors have a long history, angel investment organizations (AIOs) – or,
herein after, angel groups – are a more recent phenomenon. Angel groups are struc-
tured as semi-formal or formal networks of high-net-worth individuals which convene as
a group on a regular basis to evaluate and invest in start-ups typically within a specific
geographic region (Sohl 2007; Paul and Whittam 2010; Gregson, Mann, and Harrison
2013; Mason, Botelho, and Harrison 2013; Lahti and Keinonen 2016; Bonini et al. 2018).
They emerged in the mid-1990s and have exhibited a strong growth since then (Figure
3), in contrast to other segments of the capital market whose growth was affected by
the Global Financial Crisis (Mason and Harrison 2015).
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Some angel groups have subsequently expanded their geographical focus to the
regional, national and even international scale. Moreover, they have increasingly differ-
entiated themselves in terms of their rules of engagement, internal structure, quality,
variety and cost of the services provided. As a consequence there is considerable
heterogeneity among angel groups. Some angel organizations are less formal and
structured than angel groups. These are often referred to as a business angel network
(BAN). The main difference between BANs and angel groups lies in the BANs’ less-
stringent obligations and engagement rules for membership, such as limited or no
fees, no minimum participation requirements, and no obligation to share due diligence
costs (Mason, Botelho, and Harrison 2013). BAN members can join through a solicited or
unsolicited basis and can collaborate in organizing pitching events, training, and men-
toring activities, and coordinated lobbying efforts. Entrepreneurs are solicited to submit
their proposals to the BAN through websites and other networking activities taking
place inside the community. There is no (or limited) organized deal-group processing,
and the angel organization does not make investments on its own or recommend
investments to members; rather, each member decides whether to invest on a deal-by-
deal basis, joining other investors and co-investors and sharing preliminary valuations,
due diligence, negotiations, and term sheets. In contrast to BANs, angel groups usually
offer their associates the right to enjoy common services, including formal valuation and
due diligence activities performed in accordance with a predefined set of formal rules.
Additionally, by signing investment term sheets negotiated and set within the group
itself, associates are allowed by their angel group to invest alongside a single well-
connected angel or to join an investment vehicle together with other members of the
group.
One of the reasons for the increase in business angel organizations is the advantages
that they provide to their member investors. First, by co-investing in a given deal with
other investors, member angels can achieve the benefits of portfolio diversification, thus
reducing their individual equity stakes in the invested ventures while maintaining an
Figure 3. Number of angel investor organizations in the 1999–2015 period.
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active involvement and providing value-added contributions. A further advantage is the
opportunity for individual angels, by joining a given investment opportunity through
participation in a deal-specific angel syndicate, to make larger investments than those
that would be possible to contract on a stand-alone basis. Third, because of the larger
size of their investments, angel groups typically are much more visible than solo
investors, allowing their members the possibility to benefit from a higher quality deal
flow. Fourth, by sharing the cost of due diligence, contract design, negotiating and
closing, as well as the post investment monitoring costs, the overall transaction costs are
reduced within the context of an angel organization. Finally, a further significant
advantage comes from the information and knowledge-sharing effects that occur inside
the community. The managers of the angel investment organizations (also known as
“gatekeepers”) organize periodic training meetings and pitching events aimed at stimu-
lating the interactions between angel investors and entrepreneurs searching for funding
(Ibrahim 2008; Paul and Whittam 2010; Brush, Edelman, and Manolova 2012; Mason,
Botelho, and Harrison 2016).
Although here is no common investment process across angel groups, there are some
operating features that they typically adopt. First, entrepreneurs seeking finance from the
group are required to submit an application, whichwill likely include a copy of their business
plan/executive summary. This is followed by an initial screening phase, performed by the
organization’s staff, to reject submissions that do not fulfil the group’s minimum investment
criteria (e.g., size of investment). Firms that make it through this stage are invited to give
a short presentation to a small group of members, followed by a question and answer
session. Promising companies are then invited to present to all members at a monthly
meeting. The presenting companies that generate the greatest interest enter a due dili-
gence reviewing process. Finally, if the outcome of the in-depth analysis of all of the
information on the company is positive, the company will receive an offer of funding. The
closing of the investment follows the negotiation of the group’s standard investment
agreements by the lead investor(s) and some members of the management team of the
angel group. Tech Coast Angel, the largest angel network in the United States, provides an
example of how an angel group executes the investment decision process (Sudek,
Mitteness, and Baucus 2008; Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar 2014) (Figure 4).
An important research stream amongst the numerous contributions investigating the
transformation of the angel market in the last decade has focused on the impact of
angel investors on the investee companies – both in the United States (Kerr, Lerner, and
Schoar 2014) and worldwide (Lerner et al. 2016). A key focus of these studies has been
the attempt to disentangle the angels’ selection effect from their value-adding effect.
Consistent with the literature on the role of private equity investors on the performance
of the venture-backed companies (Lerner 1995; Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; Colombo
and Grilli 2010; Croce, Martí, and Murtinu 2013), the starting point of these studies has
been the identification of an appropriate methodological approach aimed at controlling
for the impact on investors’ screening and funding decisions of the endogenous
characteristics of the most successful companies compared to those of the lowest
performing ones. In order to remove such endogeneity issues and to differentiate the
value adding contributions of angel groups across a sample of companies applying for
funding, the authors used a “regression discontinuity approach” to analyse a predefined
set of applicant start-ups receiving different valuation outcomes; in other words, some
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companies successfully passed the screening process and others were rejected, although
the rejected companies were similar to those that were funded. This methodology uses
semi-random differences in the likelihood that a deal is funded as a way to build treated
(the funded ventures) and untreated (the unfunded ventures) samples. By looking at the
voting process taking place after the pitching events inside angel groups and relating
Figure 4. Tech Coast Angels Investment process.
Source: Sudek, Mitteness, and Baucus (2008)
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the probability of a venture being funded to the number of BAs showing interest in
a given deal, it is possible to identify the threshold where a critical mass of angels
emerges around a deal, thus determining the acceptance or the rejection of the
proposed transaction. The authors then considered for the subsequent analysis only
the “border groups”, that is, the firms falling just above and below this threshold, once
they had controlled for the similarity of the firms in the border region prior to their
obtaining access to the angel groups.
The first major finding from this research stream was to prove and quantify the positive
impact that AIOs have on the growth and survival of the companies they fund. Both in the
United States (Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar 2014) and worldwide (Lerner et al. 2016), this result is
consistent with different measures of performance, such as (i) the survivorship three years
after the funding event, (ii) the likelihood of the funded venture achieving a successful exit
(IPO or M&A) and (iii) the growth in employees, patents and web traffic performance.
A second significant finding is that it is only outside the United States that angel funding
seems tomatter significantly for the ability of a firm to obtain follow-on financing. This result
may suggest that in the United States, due to the intrinsic completeness and liquidity of its
market for start-up capital, prior angel funding is not an essential prerequisite for obtaining
access to follow-on investment rounds and, thus, even companies turned down by angel
groups are able to find alternative sources of financing. A third key finding is that the
typology of firms applying for angel funding is different across countries; compared to
applicants in more entrepreneurship-friendly countries, pitching companies in countries
with a less-conducive entrepreneurial environment are larger-sized and already revenue
generating.3 However, despite their size and maturity, the firms in these markets seek
a smaller amount of funding. A possible explanation, given the arguable scarcity of alter-
native funding options for entrepreneurs in such countries, is the tendency of firms to “self-
censor” when applying to angel groups. This is consistent with the perceived higher risk
aversion of BAs compared to venture capitalists, as they have less background in assessing
very early-stage investments. Thus, on the one hand, an estimate of the expected magni-
tude of the aggregate impact of BAs, especially in entrepreneurship-unfriendly countries, is
still an open issue for future research; but on the other hand, little is known about the nature
of the evolution in BAs’ investment practices that is required to match the investment
environment elsewhere.
A final issue that requires further investigation – as discussed in Bonini, Capizzi, and
Zocchi (2017) – is the wide heterogeneity across angel investment organizations, with
some studies making reference to angel groups, others to BANs, and others to ad hoc
club deals that allow angels not necessarily belonging to any given angel organization
to join a given deal opportunity. There is the opportunity for future research to shed
light on the possible differential impacts on the performance of new ventures made by
different types of AIOs with contrasting association rules, membership and service
structures alongside internal governance and management practices.
3.2. Business angels and venture capitalists in the start-up ecosystem:
commonalities and unique features
It is difficult to obtain precise estimates on the size of the informal venture capital
market. A large part of the market is “invisible” (Mason 2008; Sohl 2012; Landström and
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Mason 2016; Edelman, Manolova, and Brush 2017) because most angel investments are
made on an individual basis and, thus, are not subject to regulatory disclosure require-
ments. However, recent survey estimates suggest the total size of angel investments is
now close to that of venture capital in the United States, Europe and increasingly in
many other countries, as well (ACA, 2016; EBAN 2017; Kraemer-Eis et al. 2017;
InvestEurope 2018; OECD 2017).
One of major reason underlying the success of BAs is that they share many of the
positive features of VCs. First, they provide equity financing to early-stage
businesses. Second, they carefully screen their investments by undertaking intensive
due diligence, though in most cases, not by using external advisors but rather by
leveraging their experience and industry knowledge as well as the information-
sharing process taking place inside the AIOs (Bonini et al. 2018). Third, BAs are
keen to serve as mentors and, sometimes, outside directors for the ventures that
they fund, actively supporting and in some cases helping to shape their strategy and
operations. They may also provide entrepreneurs with other non-monetary contribu-
tions, such as sharing their reputation within the financial community, their knowl-
edge of the industry and their network of relationships with future company
stakeholders. Finally, as previously discussed, they monitor their investments, thereby
disciplining the entrepreneurs, though using less formal and contractual-based
mechanisms, preferring instead non-aggressive soft control mechanisms, such as
company visits, informal meetings with the entrepreneur and other trust-based
types of interactions. Beyond such commonalities, BAs have a unique feature that
distinguish them from VCs. They invest their own personal wealth, thus making them
less prone to the agency problems widely documented in the literature regarding
venture capital (Fried and Hisrich 1988; Sahlman 1990; Black and Gilson 1998;
Gompers and Lerner 1999; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003; Smith 2005; Cumming and
Johan 2013).
The fee-based compensation structures of the general partners and asset managers
of venture capital funds are now widely accepted. On the one hand, these structures
may reduce both information asymmetries and agency costs between the investors and
the fund managers by realigning the incentives of managers. On the other hand, these
remuneration mechanisms may lead to excessive fundraising, suboptimal investments
and investment decisions and, even to cases of misevaluation and overfunding of the
portfolio companies during the fund’s holding period (Gompers and Lerner 2001;
Metrick and Yasuda 2010; Chung et al. 2012; Wang and Zhang 2012; Robinson and
Sensoy 2013; Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach 2014).
It is reasonable to argue, although yet to be adequately formalized and tested, that
the type of post-investment active involvement alongside the trust-based relationship
established between BAs and entrepreneurs play a significant role in offsetting some
major issues affecting the capital markets of many countries, notably the lack of legal
protection for minority shareholders and, consequently, the thinness of such markets (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, and Shleifer 1998; La Porta et al. 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanez, and Shleifer 2013; Djankov et al. 2002, 2008).
However, because business angels are not professional investors, and their invest-
ment practices in many cases are distinctive, subjective and lacking formal due diligence
(Ibrahim 2008; Mason, Botelho, and Harrison 2013; Bonini et al. 2018), it is clear that they
VENTURE CAPITAL 149
also have particular investment challenges. Relying on informal investors might lead
entrepreneurs to be exposed to idiosyncratic funding risks either because the BAs
themselves might be affected differently by liquidity shocks over time to that of formal
investors or because BAs may change their opinions more frequently about what
projects to fund. Additionally, angels might not be prepared to invest in truly radical
high-growth projects since they are usually more risk averse than institutional investors
because their portfolios have less diversification. It is also thought that they do not have
the required professional expertise to evaluate disruptive technologies or complex
ventures operating in many different industries (Mason and Harrison 2004, 2008).
Therefore – as discussed in Mason et al in this issue – to increase the effectiveness of
this early-stage segment of the capital markets without sacrificing its distinctive and
value-adding contribution to start-ups and to growing SMEs, much has to be done by
public policies to encourage the development and professionalization of angel markets.
4. Impact of crowdfunding on the start-up ecosystem
The most recent innovation within capital markets, and particularly within the entrepre-
neurial ecosystem, is the possibility of raising funds through crowdfunding campaigns.
The concept of crowdfunding has existed for a long time, with political campaigns being
one of the earliest examples of its potential. They allow finance to be raised from a large
number of possible sponsors interested in joining a given project who each make small
financial contributions. Examples of successful crowdfunding campaigns include the
financing of artists, musicians, statues, publications, movies and sport teams.
Crowdfunding is now also used to finance investments in many industries, such as
energy, entertainment, food and beverage, ICT, real estate, e-commerce and the sharing
economy (Hervé et al. 2016; Massolution 2017; Statista 2018).
The recent exponential growth of crowdfunding has been facilitated by the techno-
logical innovation of Web 2.0, with the development of Internet-based online platforms
which has enabled crowdfunding to become simpler, more scalable, cost efficient and
more visible and attractive to retail investors (Kleemann, Voss, and Rieder 2008; Lambert
and Schwienbacher 2010; Griffin 2012; Bruton et al. 2015). Platforms, such as KickStarter,
Pebble Smartwatch, Indiegogo and Crowdcube – to cite some of the most well-known
and established ones that are capable of launching successful campaigns raising millions
of dollars – are currently the most visible development that distinguishes modern
crowdfunding from its predecessors and become a prominent pillar of the entrepre-
neurial finance ecosystem. Figures 5 and 6 highlight the tremendous growth of equity
crowdfunding over the past decade, especially when compared to that of both the
venture capital and angel finance markets
The emerging literature discusses the various conceptualisations and definitions of
crowdfunding (Harrison 2015; Giudici 2016; Pichler and Tezza 2016; Cumming and
Hornuf 2018; Wallmeroth, Wirtz, and Groh 2018; Landström, Parhankangas, and Mason
2019). Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher (2013) define the major constituting
elements and players as follows: “crowdfunding involves an open call, mostly through
the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in the form of donation or in
exchange for the future product or some form of reward and/or voting rights”. This
definition indicates that crowdfunding typically involves at least the following three key
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players: (i) the entrepreneur (the “campaigner”), who is looking to raise money for
a project or venture; (ii) the crowd of people who pool relatively small individual
contributions to support innovative projects (the so-called “backers”) and (iii) the plat-
form, which hosts the campaign and allows the fundraiser and the crowd to meet.
The motivation behind the entrepreneur’s decision to run a crowdfunding campaign,
beyond the need to meet their specific funding needs is the desire to replicate the
successful experiences of earlier campaigns and the opportunity to use the Internet to
test the market for a future product or to easily and quickly reach potential customers
(Gerber, Hui, and Kuo 2012; Mollick 2013). Moreover, a successful campaign can increase
Figure 5. Trend in equity crowdfunding, venture capital and seed stage financing.
Figure 6. Trend in crowdfunding: breakdown by typology of crowdfunding.
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the probability of completing follow-on financing rounds from more traditional sources
of funding (Leboeuf and Schwienbacher 2018). The choice of an entrepreneur to adopt
crowdfunding as a fundraising method may also be a consequence of being turned
down by other investors, such as angels, or simply because the amount of money
needed for their activity is too high to raise from family and friends and too low to be
considered by the bigger institutional investors (Brown et al. 2018)
In addition to providing small businesses with an alternative means of obtaining debt
or equity capital, and thereby reducing the funding gap between available seed capital
and the start-ups’ funding needs, crowdfunding brings many other advantages. As
already noted, it can serve as a “proof of concept”, with a successful crowdfunding
campaign attracting publicity and demonstrating the potential of a product that is still
very early in its development and thereby helping to attracting customers, employees
and investors. Further, a successful crowdfunding campaign is associated with a higher
likelihood of obtaining business partnerships and of building a strong customer base.
Finally, crowdfunding can support efforts to develop prototypes, while preserving equity
for later-stage market strategies (Gerber and Hui 2013; Belleflamme and Lambert 2014;
Kuppuswammy and Roth 2016).
One well-known example that illustrates these points is the “Pebble smart watch”
campaign. Pebble is a digital watch designed by Eric Migicovsky and developed by
Pebble Technology Corporation. After many venture capital firms rejected the opportu-
nity to invest because of the uncertainty regarding the market acceptance of the
product, a crowdfunding campaign was launched on Kickstarter. Though the original
funding target was set at 100,000 USD, in a very short time the campaign raised over
10 million USD and attracted a significant following, with approximately 68,000 potential
customers. Thanks to the performance of the crowdfunding campaign, Pebble was able
to receive a further investment from the start-up incubator “Y Combinator”.
Turning to the motivations of the backers, an initial distinction has to be made
regarding the fundraising mode and the type of compensation expected (Cumming
and Zhang 2016). There are two types of fundraising mode. Some crowdfunding
platforms allow the flow of funds according to the “all-or-nothing” rule, meaning
that the campaigner will only obtain financial resources in the event that the project
reaches the declared funding target, otherwise, the raised capital will be returned to
the investors. Other crowdfunding platforms function according to the “keep-it-all”
rule, enabling the entrepreneur to receive all the money raised, regardless of whether
or not the project was able to meet its funding target. Kickstarter is an example of an
“all-or-nothing” platform, whereas Fundly is an example of “keep-it-all platform”.
Indiegogo, offers campaigners the possibility of choosing between the two fundrais-
ing modes.
Based on the type of compensation provided to the backers, crowdfunding platforms
can be categorised as follows (Bradford 2012; De Buysere et al. 2012; Harrison 2013;
Griffin 2012; Pichler and Tezza 2016).
● Donation crowdfunding is designed for investors who do not require a direct
return in exchange for their monetary contribution. This crowdfunding model does
not provide any type of financial outcome for the investor but may offer an
intangible non-monetary reward, such as a thank-you email or an
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acknowledgement in a movie or DVD. When the project has a humanitarian or
philanthropic purpose and the campaigners are mostly not-for-profit organizations
and charitable organizations, this might be referred to as a “social lending” model.
● Reward crowdfunding consists of individuals giving their money to a project or
business with the expectation of receiving a non-financial reward in return, such as
goods or services at a later stage. A common example is a project or business
offering a unique service or a new product or a ticket to a sporting event or an art
exhibition. This form of crowdfunding allows companies to start their go-to-market
strategy with orders already obtained and with their cash flow secured, both of
which can be major challenges for new businesses.
● Pre-purchase is a particular form of the reward-based crowdfunding model that
gives investors the possibility to pay in advance for a product or service they would
be willing to buy immediately had it been available for sale. Once the production is
completed, the backers – who are also the final customers – will receive the
product at a special discount in a type of premarketing stage as a compensation
for helping the entrepreneur to develop a new product or service.
● Peer-to-peer lending, sometimes called crowdlending, is a direct alternative to
a bank loan with the difference being that, instead of borrowing from a single
source, companies borrow directly from a large number of individuals who are
ready to lend in exchange for a financial return comprising, as in the case of
a standard arm’s length bank debt, periodic payments of the interest plus the
principal at the maturity of the loan itself. In some cases, crowdlenders often bid for
loans by offering the interest rate at which they would be willing to lend. Borrowers
accept the loan that is offered at the lowest interest rate. Internet-based platforms
are used to match lenders with borrowers. Due diligence is carried out for each
loan request, as crowdfunding platforms have a duty to protect the interests of
both the businesses and the investors. Platforms normally require financial
accounts and a trading track record.
● Equity crowdfunding, also known as crowdinvesting or securities crowdfunding,
consists of selling an ownership stake in the business to a number of investors in
exchange for a conventional financial return in the form of dividends and/or capital
gains. Depending on national regulations that cover the sale of securities, the backers
allowed to participate in this type of funding model may be restricted to those who
are “accredited” or may also be available to those who are “unaccredited” (i.e., non-
professional and less-sophisticated investors). The solicitation of investors might take
place without, or with, a “light” version of a securities prospectus that does not require
the involvement of advisors providing underwriting services. The securities could be
common shares, preferred shares, shares with limited or no voting rights and mezza-
nine-finance instruments that would be convertible debt in most cases.
The third fundamental player in crowdfunding is the platform that connects the supply
and demand for seed capital. Although there is still little known about the contributions
that the many types of heterogeneous platforms that have emerged across the globe
make to the performance of the overall funding process, two major issues have been
extensively investigated: the revenue source and the management of asymmetric infor-
mation (Belleflamme, Omrani, and Peitz 2015). For the revenue sources, it is possible to
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distinguish the following: (i) the transaction fees charged on the whole amount raised,
(ii) the charges for the additional services rendered, such as the payment and advertise-
ment services, (iii) the interest earned on committed capital by the investors plus, in
a number of cases, (iv) a subscription fee paid by the investor when completing the
registration on the platform.
One major issue affecting crowdfunding deals is the inability of the crowdinvestors to
rely on the same standard mechanisms traditionally adopted by capital markets and
financial intermediaries to manage ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information, which
leads to both selection and monitoring issues. Many platforms use the following
methods to try to manage information asymmetries: performing screening activity;
extracting and disclosing signals to the market – for example, campaigners’ social capital
and reputation; providing sophisticated investors with exclusive access to investment
opportunities; stimulating syndicated investments; monitoring the development of
funded projects on a regular basis; deferring the money transfer to entrepreneurs; and
providing investors with risk management contracts hedging specific risks (Mollick 2014;
Belleflamme, Omrani, and Peitz 2015, 2015; Iyer et al. 2016; Hornuf and Schwienbacher
2016; Lambert, Ralcheva, and Roosenboom 2018; Vismara 2018).
To date little is known regarding the performance of crowdfunding campaigns and
the determinants of success and the investment decision-making process of the
crowd (Wallmeroth, Wirtz, and Groh 2018). Evidence from early studies shows that
the crowd prefers investment opportunities that are not too complex, and therefore
do not require a great deal of ex-ante costly due diligence, and that a major driver of
the investment decision may be constituted by the signals and exchange of informa-
tion among the backers taking place on the Internet during the campaigns (Ley and
Weaven 2011; Moritz, Block, and Lutz 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016; Block,
Hornuf, and Moritz 2018). Recent contributions point out the role played by personal
networks and social capital, project quality, pitch quality and the geographical
distance from investors as major drivers affecting the likelihood of a successful
campaign (Mollick 2014; Colombo, Franzoni, and Rossi-Lamastra 2015; Hornuf and
Schmitt 2016; Signori and Vismara 2016). Other factors seemingly related to the
positive performance of a crowdfunding campaign are the limited size and duration
of the funding campaign (Li and Martin 2016) and the frequency of contributions by
backers (Cordova, Dolci, and Gianfrate 2015)
4.1. Major challenges and open issues in crowdfunding
There are a number of challenges and problems in crowdfunding that affect the
project’s future growth and consolidation if not adequately addressed (Wallmeroth,
Wirtz, and Groh 2018). First, a crowdfunding campaign may fail to reach its funding
target, implying either that the intended investment cannot occur or, worse, in the case
of the all-or-nothing platforms, the capital raised has to be returned to the investors.
Moreover, considering the public visibility on the web platforms of project outcomes, an
unsuccessful campaign could create difficulties in obtaining access to other segments of
the capital markets.
Second, project backers are usually less-sophisticated and less-experienced investors,
hence do not possess the same level of expertise as professional investors, such as
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venture capitalists and angel investment organizations, when screening investment
opportunities or undertaking due diligence. Crowdfunding may be affected by
a selection issue, implying that in many cases it is unclear whether many of the funded
companies would have been better off if they had failed early or if, missing the
minimum requirements to evolve into a performing and growing venture, they had
not started their operations at all.
Third, in some cases, a successful campaign may lead to overfunding, meaning that
the capital raised is well above the funding goal (Mollick 2014). Such a scenario may be
the outcome of a lack of the campaigners’ financial background and, therefore, poor
business planning skills or may arise from a misunderstanding of the nature of crowd-
funding itself by the backers, who may consider the platform a sort of shopping website
for purchasing or pre-ordering new products. Campaigns with this type of outcome has
risks for backers, such as the possibility that the project may fail or be delayed, especially
if the entrepreneur has not adequately structured the organization and operations to be
consistent with the high and unexpected volume of capital raised. The outcome may be
that an apparently successful crowdfunding campaign does not necessarily evolve into
a successful business. This is demonstrated by the “Coolest Cooler” project which was
posted on Kickstarter in 2014, offering a “souped-up cooler” complete with Bluetooth
speakers, a blender, and USB charger. It started with a funding goal of $50,000 and soon
exceeded its goal, receiving over $13 million from over 62,000 project backers. However,
because of the massive unexpected change in the scale of manufacturing required to
meet the demand from its backers, the production incurred significant delays, leaving
two-thirds of the backers without the Coolest Cooler two years later. The resulting sense
of disappointment and outrage makes it clear that many backers had viewed their
investment as basically a purchase of the product.
A fourth problem affecting crowdfunding is the lack of experience, business and
financial knowledge of the backers and their lack of network relationships may create
a competitive disadvantage for businesses backed by the crowd compared with those
supported by VCs and BAs in the post-investment phase because of their lower non-
monetary contributions, impacting the company’s value creation path. Additionally, the
crowd may not have the necessary background and cognitive orientation required to
understand and select radically innovative projects. This is not a problem of information
asymmetry but rather an issue involving the correct processing and assessment of the
information on a given innovative project that is posted on the platform. For instance,
Chan and Parhankangas (2017) show that crowdfunding campaigns focused on pro-
ducts incorporating incremental innovation are more likely than campaigns dealing with
radical innovative products of reaching their funding goals.
Fifth, investors might be exposed to significant liquidity risks due to the lack of an
officially regulated secondary market. This may make it hard, or even impossible, for
them to easily and quickly sell their stakes in a venture that they acquired when
participating in a given crowdfunding campaign (Kirby and Worner 2014; Bradford
2018).
A final issue is the possible plagiarism risk that arises as a consequence of the
Internet-based, public nature of crowdfunding. This means that it is not always possible
to protect products and ideas posted on web platforms with patents or to enforce
property right in order to prevent other Internet users from becoming competitors and
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entering the market earlier than developer of the original idea (Valanciene and
Jegeleviciute 2013). Many potential entrepreneurs and small businesses might therefore
be disincentivised from even starting crowdfunding campaigns if they think that they do
not have the ability to prevent others from gaining access to, and imitating their idea.
4.2. Fraud and regulation in crowdfunding across the world
One of the major issues potentially affecting crowdfunding campaigns is fraud, hence
a major stream of contributions in the emerging research field of crowdfunding deals
with regulations across countries and the relationship between specific regulatory
requirements and the growth and performance of crowd-backed companies (Kirby
and Worner 2014; Hornuf and Schmitt 2016; Armour and Enriques 2018a).
Fraud in crowdfunding arises from the information asymmetry affecting such an
innovative segment of the capital markets, leading to cases where the campaigner
hides the true financial status of the funded venture or uses the money raised for
purposes different from those disclosed to the backers. For example, a recent survey
of compliance by CrowdCheck found that approximately 40% of the companies on these
sites did not have their financial results audited or certified, falling well below the basic
rules set down by the SEC (Popper 2017). Another type of fraud is inherently related to
the Internet-based nature of the platforms that creates the potential for identify theft,
money laundering, data-protection violations and terrorism financing. The problem with
this class of fraudulent behaviours is it is observable only on an ex-post basis and the
observation is limited to the detected cases (Wang 2013; Hainz 2018).
One fundamental safety net to protect investors in the capital markets is provided by
regulatory authorities, who, in terms of transparency and information disclosure, have
the power to set ad hoc rules that companies issuing securities have to be compliant
with. However, in the case of crowdfunding, given the limited ticket size of most
campaigns, it would be too expensive for issuers to sustain the compliance costs of
ordinary securities regulation. Hence, across different country jurisdictions, in the last
few years there have been alternative regulatory measures aimed at incentivizing equity
crowdfunding by relaxing the rigor of ordinary securities regulation (Pope 2011;
Weinstein 2013; Armour and Enriques 2018a). For instance, in the United States in
2012, the Obama administration launched the JOBS (Jumpstart Our Business Startups)
Act, whose “Title II” rule provided special exemptions to campaigners running unregis-
tered Internet offerings targeted at “accredited” investors (institutional investors and
high net worth individual investors who were deemed capable of understanding the
risks from financial investments or, at least, of affording the cost of access to financial
advisors) which delegated to platforms the burden to check the quality of the financial
information disclosed by funded companies and their compliance with the rules set
down by the regulatory authorities. Since then, several platforms have progressively
better structured their operations, implementing alternative solutions to avoid adverse
selection problems and to ensure the quality of the offerings in terms of, at least, self-
imposed disclosure requirements (Armour and Enriques 2018b). As a consequence,
successful Title II platforms are starting to operative more similar to traditional VC
firms in their screening, investment and monitoring policies. For example, OurCrowd
pools money from investors into special purpose vehicles and creates funds focused on
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sectors, regions, or growth phases. As a consequence – as observable from Figure 7 –
the number of Title II crowdfunding campaigns has decreased over time, but the dollar
value has increased. This may have also happened because the higher selectivity of the
platform investors has made investors more confident, numerous and available to invest
larger amounts.
By the end of 2015, the SEC added to the JOBS Act the Title III rule, which finally went
into effect in May 2016. Under Title III, subject to a certain degree of business and
financial information disclosed to both the crowdinvesting platform and the retail
investors, private companies are allowed to solicit funds up to 1 million USD from
unaccredited investors. It is still forbidden, however, for platforms to structure special
purpose vehicles in a manner similar to the way that private equity funds and angel
investment organizations structure vehicles to pool together individual investors’ sav-
ings (Oranburg 2015). Furthermore, the issue of the trade-off between the volume of
information disclosed and the plagiarism risk discussed earlier still remains open.
Particularly for small businesses needing secrecy, this could be a potentially major and
penalizing situation.
In Europe, the attitude of the regulatory bodies dealing with the sale and trading of
securities have progressively changed to favour the growth of equity crowdfunding,
although there is currently still no unified regime applicable to the sale and under-
writing of securities. Rather, there are a mix of different national regimes, partly harmo-
nized by the EU Prospectus Directive. EU member States were given partial exemptions
from current regulations on financial services (MiFID II) when dealing with small-sized
equity offerings, dispensing with the requirement for issuers to comply with ordinary
security regulations. Such exemptions made it possible to stimulate Internet-based
crowdfunding campaigns and to target equity offerings to both professional and retail
investors. But this benefit is offset by the requirement of crowdfunding platforms to
screen the quality of the issuers and to assess whether a given investment is appropriate
for the investors. However, there is a great deal of flexibility for platforms in setting the
appropriate screening mechanisms, resulting in significant heterogeneity among
Figure 7. Number and value of Title II crowdfunding campaigns.
Source: Quittner (2016)
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European platforms in terms of operations, contract design and offering procedures. For
instance, some platforms only list companies simultaneously backed by business angels
and retail investors, while other platforms offer to the crowd the same contractual
protection devices typically used by venture capitalists, such as pre-emption rights,
veto rights, tag-along rights and so forth (Armour and Enriques 2018b).
Outside Europe and the United States, China is experiencing an explosive growth in
crowdfunding (Figure 8). Its first platforms appeared in 2011. The high number of
projects searching for seed capital matched with the increasing supply of available
financial resources coming from the crowd progressively shifting from a savings-
oriented to an investment-oriented culture has boosted crowdfunding activity, making
it the largest crowdfunding market in the world (Liang 2015). However, the rapid growth
of this alternative funding channel has come at the cost of cases of fraud because of the
much lower regulatory burden in China compared to that in other countries. At the
same time, in a context of insufficient regulation, the platforms have failed to both
perform their screening role and to disclose adequate levels of information on the
quality of the listed ventures to the backers.
An interesting example is the crowdfunding platform Ezubao, first launched in 2014
and becoming, in a short time, one of the 10 largest P2P lending platforms in China.
Approximately 900,000 individual investors collectively lost $7.6 billion with an esti-
mated 95% of all the Ezubao borrower listings reported to be fraudulent. In this case, it
is clear that the investors’ money was used by top executives for their own purposes.
This type of case, amongst others, contributed to the tightening of the regulations in
the industry by the end of December 2014. The current crowdfunding regulation, which
is still a draft regulation, limits investments to accredited investors. However, the need
for still tighter – and official – regulations remains a major challenge in China; a total of
43 Chinese platforms were closed between 2015 and 2016 due to fraudulent fundrais-
ing, misrepresentation, internal conflict and lack of funding (Lin 2017).
Figure 8. Crowdfunding trend in China (breakdown by typology).
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In summary, the extent to which the crowdfunding market should be regulated
remains an open issue depending on the specific choices made by policymakers who
have to balance between the need to limit information asymmetries and the prevention
of fraudulent behaviour with the opportunity to relax standard regulations on the sale
and trading of ordinary securities. Research on this topic is proceeding but it will take
time for the results and policy suggestions to be implemented on a homogeneous basis
all over the world (Bruton et al. 2015; Fraser, Bhaumik, and Wright 2015; Dushnitsky et al.
2016; Klöhn, Hornuf, and Schilling 2016; Cumming and Vismara 2017).
5. Direct investing and the mutual funds industry: the disintermediation of
the venture capital and private equity funds?
Institutional investors undertaking direct investments in small unlisted ventures, and
therefore bypassing the traditional closed-end fund structure of venture capital and
private equity funds, is a further category of investments experiencing growth in recent
years (Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner 2015). Figure 9 shows that the increase of shadow
capital (defined as co-investments, direct investments and separately managed
accounts) accounts for almost 33% of the estimated total volume of capital raised on
a worldwide basis by the mutual funds industry in 2017.
In the traditional direct investing setting, institutional investors – also termed limited
partners (LPs) – such as sovereign funds, family offices, funds of funds, foundations and
endowments, insurance companies and even pension funds, subscribe to the shares of
private equity funds that are managed by specialized investors, the so-called general
partners (GPs) who are responsible for the entire investment process, including deal selec-
tion, negotiation and deal contracting, monitoring and exiting (Gompers and Lerner 1999;































Figure 9. Growth trends for shadow capital and traditional fund investments.
Source: Triago (2018)
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role, GPs earn an annual management fee – usually ranging from 1.5 to 2% of the committed
capital or assets under management – and a performance fee (also called “carried interest”),
usually set at 20% of the fund’s overall gross return. The direct investing expertise and
capabilities of the LPs is less than that of the GPs, and so they have limited or no control over
the fund’s portfolio companies and hence play a passive role as capital providers.
However, as shown in Figure 10, LPs can provide a more blended direct investing
setting by “co-investing” alongside private equity funds in deals that are pre-selected
and proposed by the GPs. In such cases, the LPs play a more active role in deciding
whether to invest and typically benefit from the lower fees charged by the GPs, who
maintain control over the whole deal value chain, including the exit decision. Compared
to traditional delegated investing, co-investing requires the LPs to make quick decisions
about investing in a specific asset, implying they must be able to conduct their own
secondary due diligence process.
Another business model is “solo investing” where the institutional investors directly
originate and invest in a given deal on their own without any type of delegated scheme.
Such a fully independent investment decision-making process enables the LPs to save
on the management and performance fees that are part of the traditional investment
model. However, it implies that they have financial and non-financial capabilities to
Figure 10. Alternative business models in private equity investments.
160 S. BONINI AND V. CAPIZZI
perform both the selection phase and the monitoring phase during the holding period.
But to build a skilled and legitimated internal investment team involves significantly
higher in-house costs for LPs that choose a solo investing business model.
There are at least five reasons behind this increased trend for institutional investors to
make direct private investments through solo or co-investing business models (Fang,
Ivashina, and Lerner 2015). First, for the subscribers of the funds’ shares, direct invest-
ments do not entail the same investment costs that private equity funds charge: that is
the “2-and-20” fee structure in which “2” represents the annual management fee and
“20” represents the carried interest. As a consequence, the overall investment cost on an
annual basis is estimated within the range of 5–7%, which reduces the investors’ net
returns (Metrick and Yasuda 2010).
Second, by direct investing, LPs are able to have greater control over their investment
decisions, being able to select on their own (“cherry picking”) the deals in which to
invest, whereas in the delegated investing setting, the LPs can only accept or reject the
investment opportunities proposed by the GPs.
Third, direct investments give LPs the capability to better manage the time to market
of their investment decisions. The private equity literature shows that due to the
existence of agency costs stemming from the delegation given to GPs, private equity
investments are highly cyclical, making the performance achieved by the funds’ sub-
scribers more volatile and suboptimal (Gompers and Lerner 2001; Kaplan and Schoar
2005; Axelson et al. 2013). Adopting non-delegated investing business models might
give LPs a higher degree of freedom in deciding when to invest or to suspend their
investments, increasing their expected returns.
Fourth, direct investments give the LPs greater ability to customize their risk expo-
sures because they do not have to rely on GPs decisions regarding deal selection and
the size and timing of investments. Institutional investors therefore benefit from an
increased flexibility and customization of their investment policies, making their invest-
ment portfolios risks more consistent with their expected risk-return profiles.
A final advantage of direct investing in private firms is that it offers a better alignment
of the interests between the LPs and the GPs in a classic principal-agent problem
(Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai 2007; Becker and Ivashina 2015). In certain periods
in the life of a closed-end fund, GPs might allocate a major share of their time to specific
issues, such as trying to restructure a distressed portfolio company or executing an IPO
for an investee company. This could create distractions for the GPs that might lead to
a suboptimal investment process in time-periods characterised by hot markets when it
could be particularly appropriate to invest the fund’s capital. The more active role played
by the LPs in the co-investing business model minimizes the principal-agent problem
and guarantees a higher average asset quality over the whole fund’s investment period.
5.1 Outcomes and challenges for direct investing in private companies
Direct investing also has challenges for institutional investors. The biggest challenge in solo
investing concerns that lack of investment capability of LPs. To do solo deals, LPs need to
build those deal-level screening, due diligence, operational, monitoring and exiting cap-
abilities that are traditionally part of the job of GP managers. Acquiring such investment
skills is costly. However, making direct investments without these skills may result in a worse
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asset quality when compared to that of private equity funds and, therefore, may result in
lower realized gross returns for investors (Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner 2015).
The business model of co-investing might also have downsides. First, co-investments
typically deal with larger-sized investments, allowing GPs to complement the private
equity fund’s available ticket size with further additional capital. On average, larger deals
perform worse than the smaller-sized ones executed without the co-investing business
model (Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou, and Gottschalg 2011). Second, as co-investing
partners, the GPs benefit from an information advantage over the LPs: the GPs typically
manage the deal flow and screening process and offer investment opportunities to LPs
with limited time windows for them to conduct their own due diligence and decide
whether or not to participate in the deals. This might also lead to an adverse selection
problem, given that the GPs could invite LPs to join below average quality investment
opportunities with the effect of lower gross returns, which may not be offset by the
lower operating costs in terms of management fees, carried interest fees as well as in the
number and compensation of inside managers.
To investigate the existence of a trade-off between operating costs and investment
quality across these business models in private equity investments, Fang, Ivashina, and
Lerner (2015) compared the performance of a sample of 391 direct investments (61% co-
investments and 39% solo investments) made by a set of institutional investors between
1991 and 2011 against the performance of public market indices (“PME ratios”) and
private equity and venture capital funds. The main conclusion from the analysis was that
direct investments, though performing better than the tailored public market indices, do
not significantly outperform relative to the performance of private equity fund bench-
marks. For venture capital deals, the authors found that direct investments in start-up
companies underperform when compared to the performance indicated by the funds’
benchmark across the whole sample period (Figure 11).
Regarding the alternative business models in direct investments, co-investments
underperform when comparing their performance to that of the investments of the
corresponding fund with which they co-invest, with the performance gap widening in
the more recent time period of the sample (the 2000s), thereby confirming the presence
of a possible adverse selection phenomenon (Table 1).
Finally, solo investments slightly outperform fund investments, though the perfor-
mance gap appears to be deteriorating over time. However, solo deals seem to be
successful when the transactions involve companies that are already mature (“buy-out”
deals), located close to the institutional investors (“local” deals) and that are not focused
on complex production technologies (“plain vanilla” deals), all cases where information
issues are less severe than those in the start-up ecosystem.
In summary, it would appear to be relatively difficult for institutional investors, who do
not have an appropriate investment skillset, to capture the rents that closed-end fund
managers are able to achieve though their traditional fund-based business model.
5.2 Mutual funds as venture capitalists: preliminary evidence
Traditional open-end mutual funds are a further category of institutional investors that are
now beginning to participate in the venture capital industry. Because of their open-ended
nature and obligation to meet all the redemption orders coming from the funds’
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shareholders, mutual funds should be unable to invest in illiquid securities (Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang 2010; Chernenko and Sunderan 2016; Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng
2017). Moreover, the passive investment role of mutual funds and their limited engage-
ment with the firms in their portfolios contrasts with the activism of venture capitalists.
However, in recent years, a trend can be observed of mutual funds making direct
investments in private firms (Kwon, Lowry, and Qian 2017; Chernenko, Lerner, and Zeng
2017), particularly firms with estimated valuations of above a billion dollars (also known as
“unicorns”), providing scholars with the opportunity to investigate whether, and how,
passive institutional investors contribute to the performance of such private investments.
Chernenko, Lerner, and Zeng (2017) focus on the contractual provisions associated
with the direct investments of mutual funds in unicorns to identify the determinants
their investments and the extent of their involvement in the monitoring and governance
of the companies in which they invest. Based on a sample of 153 private firms under-
going investment rounds by open-end mutual funds in the 2012–2016 time period, the
authors found that larger sized funds and funds with more stable funding are more














Direct Investments Benchmarks funds
Figure 11. Comparative analysis of direct investment performances: Public Market Equivalent (PME)
ratios.
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015).
Table 1. Co-investment relative performance (differences in performance between co-investments
and the corresponding fund).
Co-investment IRR – Fund IRR, (%)
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th % Median 75th %
1994 1 11.99 – 11.99 11.99 11.99
1997 2 −52.93 81.85 −110.80 −52.93 4.95
1999 1 2.06 – 2.06 2.06 2.06
2000 1 8.74 – 8.74 8.74 8.74
2001 4 −4.15 40.97 −34.67 −2.60 26.37
2002 3 47.72 40.14 1.40 69.30 72.46
2003 3 18.14 19.04 −2.40 21.60 35.21
2004 4 −2.85 90.81 −79.25 8.90 73.55
2005 10 2.79 29.92 −15.99 −9.24 18.55
200 18 −10.51 30.03 −17.95 −6.37 2.30
2007 33 −16.08 33.46 −20.34 −6.32 0.70
2008 9 −25.54 31.92 −23.80 −11.06 −6.80
2010 8 −1.27 30.03 −13.21 −8.60 15.75
2011 6 −13.22 8.27 −16.90 −13.60 −9.30
Total 103 −8,98*** 36.70 −17.95 −7.3 2.8
Source: Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015)
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provisions (cash flow rights, voting and control rights, board representation mechan-
isms), they found that mutual funds provide significantly fewer governance services than
those of traditional closed-end venture capital funds. The authors also found that the
investments of mutual funds are associated with significantly stronger redemption rights
and less strict formal procedures to trigger the redemption itself (Figure 12).
Overall, the results of the empirical analysis suggest that once again managers in
traditional institutional investment institutions are unlikely to have the investment skills
and capabilities required to monitor unlisted small companies or to contribute to their
strategy formulation and operations management. However, the need to hedge the
illiquidity risk pushes portfolio managers to actively manage their assets, making them
better able than venture capitalists to redeem their stocks in their portfolio companies
when facing redemption pressures from their own shareholders. One a major implica-
tion that remains an open issue for further research is the identification of an adequate
“fundraising mix” for new ventures, capable of leveraging the heterogeneous contribu-
tions that different financial investors might bring to entrepreneurs.
6. Conclusions
In recent decades the entrepreneurial finance start-up ecosystem, once the exclusive
territory of venture capitalists with their established closed-end funds investment busi-
ness model, has been re-shaped by the emergence of new players. Start-up incubators
Figure 12. Contractual provisions in rounds with or without mutual funds.
Source: Chernenko, Lerner, and Zeng (2017)
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and accelerators are increasing in number and increasingly offer equity capital alongside
their mentoring and education services. Business angels are progressively deploying
more of their wealth in start-up investments, increasingly structuring themselves as
angel investment organizations. Crowdfunding platforms are attracting large capital
flows from accredited and unaccredited investors in countries all around the world.
And, increasing numbers of institutional investors are abandoning the traditional ven-
ture capital and private equity investment approach in favour of direct investments
through solo investing and co-investing. Each of these new actors has widened the
funding options available to new ventures, greatly increasing the capability of the
financial system to boost innovation and entrepreneurship. But what are the conse-
quences for venture capital firms? Are these new players threatening their role in this
risky and opaque segment of the capital market?
In this paper, we have presented the major challenges facing these emerging
players in the entrepreneurial finance start-up ecosystem. The average angel investor
lacks investment expertise and might not be prepared to invest in truly radical high
growth projects. In addition, firms seem to “self-censor” when applying to angel
groups, consistent with the perceived higher risk aversion arising from the lack of
experience of BAs – compared to venture capitalists – in assessing very early-stage
investments.
Crowdfunding is dominated by high information asymmetry, leading to selection
issues because project backers are usually less sophisticated and inexperienced inves-
tors. Additionally, the crowd may not have the adequate background and cognitive
orientation required to understand and select radically innovative projects. A further
challenge is that many investors do not have the skills and capabilities to offer non-
monetary contributions aimed at supporting the value creation path of the companies
in which they invest. Furthermore, in many countries the legal response of the
regulatory authorities to manage the fraudulent behaviour that may affect crowdfund-
ing has been slow. Even if crowdfunding platforms are trying to protect project
backers from risks, information asymmetry is still an issue that prevents many potential
investors from gaining access to this segment of capital market, while the plagiarism
risk arising from the need to provide information about their business on crowdfund-
ing platforms deters many entrepreneurs from raising finance in this way.
In the case of direct-investment by institutional investors, the different approaches
to private equity investing present a puzzling trade-off between cost and investment
quality. Fund investing is expensive because of the management and performance
fees charged by closed-end funds, but the average investment made by funds may be
of a higher quality. On the other hand, direct investing may not cost as much, but the
typical transaction may be of lower quality. Reinforcing this trade-off is that the staff of
the LPs typically receive lower compensation than the investment professionals in
private equity and venture capital funds, reflecting the frequent association of institu-
tional investors with government and non-profit firms.
Despite their increasing presence, these alternative emerging actors within the
entrepreneurial finance ecosystem do not seem to be able – at least so far – to make
the VC system wholly obsolete. Venture capital remains a matter of human capital,
requiring investment skills and capabilities to undertake the screening, negotiating and
monitoring of opaque and risky businesses which are fundamental for the growth of the
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economy. We leave to future research the issue of investigating the conditions under
which the various investors in unlisted companies will achieve legitimation and eco-
nomic justification. Another promising research issue is the analysis of the many differ-
ent and alternative funding trajectories arising from the possible financing choices of
new ventures, which can select one investor over another, or mix in different ways the
available financing opportunities that the start-up ecosystem now offers.
Notes
1. See the annual statistics about venture capital and private equity investments collected and
processed by NAVCA for the US, Invest Europe (formerly, EVCA) for Europe, and by AVCJ for Asia.
2. Internal finance could possibly be complemented by entrepreneurial bootstrapping (Winborg
and Landström 2001) and trade credit, which is more likely than short-term bank debt to be
offered to start-ups and credit-constrained SMEs (Petersen and Rajan 1997). However, due to
the high mismatch between the maturities of assets and liabilities, bothsuch sources of
financing are not to be used to meet the fixed asset investment needs companies typically
have to face in their start-up phase, ultimately further increasing business risk.
3. The authors use the following proxies as measures of entrepreneurship-friendliness of
a country: (i) the depth of the venture capital market as a fraction of the domestic GDP
and (ii) the number of regulatory procedures while incorporating a firm (consistent with
Djankov et al. 2002).
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